Knowing the Normative World
Manuscript in progress
Textbook accounts of ethical knowledge make the acquisition of moral knowledge out to be an abstract, a priori, affair. If we have moral knowledge at all, a common thought goes, we do not acquire that knowledge in the way we acquire knowledge about colors, neutrons, galaxies, or depleted ozones. We acquire moral knowledge more in the way we acquire mathematical knowledge. The same cannot be said about our aesthetic knowledge--knowledge about beauty, sublimity, tastiness etc. Textbook accounts of aesthetic knowledge hold that the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge is sensuous. Indeed, the history of aesthetics provides many skeptics about the possibility of aesthetic knowledge without the engagement of the senses.
This book focuses on the similarities between the epistemology of aesthetics and the epistemology of ethics. Despite these textbook thoughts, I think that there are important affinities between the two areas. Hardly any contemporary work has been done connecting these two literatures. I think this is a mistake, for I think that we can make significant progress in both areas by thinking about them in tandem.
The book has three different parts. The first part is about methods that yield direct access to aesthetic and ethical facts. The main claim defended in this part is that we perceive normative facts with the traditional sense modalities, with vision being the focus. In addition, I defend views about the proper role of acquaintance in aesthetics, the epistemology of normative perception, and the epistemology of the imagination. I argue that methods that yield direct access are especially important. This is because direct access provides a particularly important sort of knowledge. This is what I call appreciative knowledge. It is so called because it enables fitting appreciation of the normative facts, which is crucial in having a fully fitting reaction to the normative world.
The second part of the book is about methods that yield indirect access to aesthetic and ethical facts. One such method has generated a huge literature recently. This is deference. When x defers to y on some issue, x adopts a view on the basis of y adopting that view. In this way, deferential beliefs are second hand and thus indirect. Many are very skeptical about the merits of deference in both metaethics and aesthetics. Some--the pessimists--maintain that we shouldn't defer at all. I am a moderate optimist. I think that there is no general requirement not to defer--hence the optimism. Nevertheless, there is something that is always deficient about deference; deference doesn't provide direct access and thus doesn't enable appreciative knowledge. This is a defect of deference as a method for gaining normative knowledge--hence the moderation.
Deference is one method that yields indirect access. Part two of the book also discusses a second method. This is inference. In aesthetics deference and inference are very often batched together. Virtually no one lumps them together in metaethics. I will argue that we should adopt the same moderate optimism about (many forms of) inference that we adopt about deference. This result further hampers the case of pessimism but also forces epistemologists of ethics to reckon with the downsides of (many forms of) inference, something that they haven't done before.
The final part of the book is about expertise and what it takes to be a thriving ethical and aesthetic agent. One theme that emerges from the first two parts is that debates about the relative merits of different methods of thinking about ethics and aesthetics are very often driven by background views about the nature of thriving ethical or aesthetic agency. One of the key questions is about which epistemic achievement lies at the heart of such thriving. My view is that appreciative knowledge is that epistemic achievement. Others, most prominently Alison Hills, disagree. Hills argues that understanding is the key epistemic achievement. The penultimate chapter of the book argues against this view.
The final chapter is about the varieties of ethical and aesthetic expertise. Most discussions of ethical expertise focus on various forms of skepticism. I argue that these skeptical views are unwarranted, at least if skepticism about ethical knowledge is false. The main goal of the chapter, however, is to bring to light the sort of perceptual expertise that is crucial to the acquisition of appreciative knowledge. This sort of expertise has not been neglected in aesthetics, as it is crucial to the sort of expertise enjoyed by art critics. It is neglected in the epistemology of ethics. I argue that not only is this sort of expertise important, there are strong grounds for a new field of inquiry into ethics. This field of inquiry investigates the ethical world in the same way that art criticism investigates the aesthetic world. Engaging in this inquiry would both help us learn more about the ethical world and would allow for a sort of deep engagement with ethics untethered from the theoretical ambitions of other sorts of ethical investigation. This has important consequences for establishing a healthy intellectual culture about ethics.
***
I will be putting up drafts of chapters here as I finish them. They are password protected. If you would like the password, please email me at errol 'dot' lord 'at' gmail.com.
Chapter One, Making Things Real (introductory chapter): Draft here.
Chapter Two, Knowing What it's Like: Draft here.
Chapter Three, Perceiving the Normative World: Draft here.
Chapter Four, The Epistemic Significance of High-Level Content and Perceptual Proofs: Draft here
Chapter Five, Appreciative Knowledge from the Comforts of Home: Draft here
Chapter Six, Learning but Not Appreciating Through Deference: Draft here
Chapter Seven, Learning but Not Appreciating Through Inference: Draft here
Chapter Eight, On Being an Excellent Human: Draft here.
Chapter Nine, The Varieties of Normative Expertise: Thinking, Seeing, Criticizing
This book focuses on the similarities between the epistemology of aesthetics and the epistemology of ethics. Despite these textbook thoughts, I think that there are important affinities between the two areas. Hardly any contemporary work has been done connecting these two literatures. I think this is a mistake, for I think that we can make significant progress in both areas by thinking about them in tandem.
The book has three different parts. The first part is about methods that yield direct access to aesthetic and ethical facts. The main claim defended in this part is that we perceive normative facts with the traditional sense modalities, with vision being the focus. In addition, I defend views about the proper role of acquaintance in aesthetics, the epistemology of normative perception, and the epistemology of the imagination. I argue that methods that yield direct access are especially important. This is because direct access provides a particularly important sort of knowledge. This is what I call appreciative knowledge. It is so called because it enables fitting appreciation of the normative facts, which is crucial in having a fully fitting reaction to the normative world.
The second part of the book is about methods that yield indirect access to aesthetic and ethical facts. One such method has generated a huge literature recently. This is deference. When x defers to y on some issue, x adopts a view on the basis of y adopting that view. In this way, deferential beliefs are second hand and thus indirect. Many are very skeptical about the merits of deference in both metaethics and aesthetics. Some--the pessimists--maintain that we shouldn't defer at all. I am a moderate optimist. I think that there is no general requirement not to defer--hence the optimism. Nevertheless, there is something that is always deficient about deference; deference doesn't provide direct access and thus doesn't enable appreciative knowledge. This is a defect of deference as a method for gaining normative knowledge--hence the moderation.
Deference is one method that yields indirect access. Part two of the book also discusses a second method. This is inference. In aesthetics deference and inference are very often batched together. Virtually no one lumps them together in metaethics. I will argue that we should adopt the same moderate optimism about (many forms of) inference that we adopt about deference. This result further hampers the case of pessimism but also forces epistemologists of ethics to reckon with the downsides of (many forms of) inference, something that they haven't done before.
The final part of the book is about expertise and what it takes to be a thriving ethical and aesthetic agent. One theme that emerges from the first two parts is that debates about the relative merits of different methods of thinking about ethics and aesthetics are very often driven by background views about the nature of thriving ethical or aesthetic agency. One of the key questions is about which epistemic achievement lies at the heart of such thriving. My view is that appreciative knowledge is that epistemic achievement. Others, most prominently Alison Hills, disagree. Hills argues that understanding is the key epistemic achievement. The penultimate chapter of the book argues against this view.
The final chapter is about the varieties of ethical and aesthetic expertise. Most discussions of ethical expertise focus on various forms of skepticism. I argue that these skeptical views are unwarranted, at least if skepticism about ethical knowledge is false. The main goal of the chapter, however, is to bring to light the sort of perceptual expertise that is crucial to the acquisition of appreciative knowledge. This sort of expertise has not been neglected in aesthetics, as it is crucial to the sort of expertise enjoyed by art critics. It is neglected in the epistemology of ethics. I argue that not only is this sort of expertise important, there are strong grounds for a new field of inquiry into ethics. This field of inquiry investigates the ethical world in the same way that art criticism investigates the aesthetic world. Engaging in this inquiry would both help us learn more about the ethical world and would allow for a sort of deep engagement with ethics untethered from the theoretical ambitions of other sorts of ethical investigation. This has important consequences for establishing a healthy intellectual culture about ethics.
***
I will be putting up drafts of chapters here as I finish them. They are password protected. If you would like the password, please email me at errol 'dot' lord 'at' gmail.com.
Chapter One, Making Things Real (introductory chapter): Draft here.
Chapter Two, Knowing What it's Like: Draft here.
Chapter Three, Perceiving the Normative World: Draft here.
Chapter Four, The Epistemic Significance of High-Level Content and Perceptual Proofs: Draft here
Chapter Five, Appreciative Knowledge from the Comforts of Home: Draft here
Chapter Six, Learning but Not Appreciating Through Deference: Draft here
Chapter Seven, Learning but Not Appreciating Through Inference: Draft here
Chapter Eight, On Being an Excellent Human: Draft here.
Chapter Nine, The Varieties of Normative Expertise: Thinking, Seeing, Criticizing
The Importance of Being rational
Oxford University Press, 2018
Despite the fact that rationality plays a central role in both ethics and epistemology, ethicists and epistemologists have come to significantly diverging views about rationality. In ethics and metaethics, it has become popular to think that rationality is a matter of being coherent in certain respects—e.g., not being akratic or means-end incoherent. Epistemologists disagree. Very few epistemologists think that being coherent is sufficient for being rational. This book defends a unified account of rationality that sides with the epistemologists. I argue that coherence is not sufficient for being rational. In so doing, I develop novel views that allow us to make progress on important problems in both metaethics and epistemology.
According to my view, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to the reasons you possess. Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of reacting in certain ways. The normative reasons you possess are the normative reasons that are within your ken in a privileged way. This book defends novel accounts of what it is to possess a reason, what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and what it is to be obligated to do something. I argue that these views allow us to explain the data about rationality and allow us to solve major problems in both ethics and epistemology.
On the epistemological side, my view explains how it is that internal duplicates are equally rational despite the fact that those in favorable epistemic environments have an advantage over their internally alike deceived counterparts. On the ethical side, it allows us to explain how it is that what we are rationally required to do affects what we ought to do. Indeed, I argue that what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Thus, on my picture, rationality is very important indeed.
***
A symposium was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2020, with contributions from Karl Schafer, Mark Schroeder, and Julia Staffel. My précis can be found here and my replies can be found here. Schafer's contribution can be found here, Schroeder's here, and Staffel's here.
A symposium was published in Analysis in 2021, with contributions from Matt Bedke & Bruno Guindon, Allan Hazlett, and Jonathan Way. My précis can be found here and my replies can be found here. Bedke & Guindon's contribution is here, Hazlett's is here, and Way's is here.
PeaSoup hosted an Ethics review forum on Nathan Robert Howard's review. You can find that here.
Review in NDPR by Hallvard Lillehammer
Review in Philosophical Review by Julia Staffel
Review in Ethics by Nathan Robert Howard
Review in the European Journal of Philosophy by Olle Risberg
Review in Philosophical Quarterly by Carlos Núñez
***
Here are some nice things people have said about the book:
"Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational is a tour de force treatment of the relationship between reasons, rationality, knowledge, and what Lord calls creditworthiness , the kind of achievement where you don’t just do what is right, but do it for the right reasons." Mark Schroeder in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
"Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational is a beautiful presentation of how one might defend a reasons‐first approach to rationality. And it has many insights that will be useful to non‐reasons‐firsters as well. As such, there’s a great deal in the details of Lord’s arguments that repays careful consideration." Karl Schafer in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
"[T]he book offers an informed, original, rich, sophisticated and exceptionally well-illustrated case for the claim that what we are rationally required to do and what we substantially ought to do is really the same thing. To follow Errol Lord on his route to this conclusion is a frequently rewarding experience and one that is well worth undertaking." Hallvard Lillehammer in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"The Importance of Being Rational marks a new moment in debates about the nature of rationality. It is absolutely compulsory reading for epistemologists, ethicists, and meta-ethicists alike." Nathan Robert Howard in Ethics
"The Importance of Being Rational is a rich, ambitious, and thought‐provoking book." Olle Risberg in the European Journal of Philosophy
"[Lord's] book is an essential reading in the literature on reasons." Julia Staffel in The Philosophical Review
"[T]he book is an admirable philosophical feat that rewards careful study. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature, and worth, of rationality." Carlos Núñez in The Philosophical Quarterly
According to my view, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to the reasons you possess. Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of reacting in certain ways. The normative reasons you possess are the normative reasons that are within your ken in a privileged way. This book defends novel accounts of what it is to possess a reason, what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and what it is to be obligated to do something. I argue that these views allow us to explain the data about rationality and allow us to solve major problems in both ethics and epistemology.
On the epistemological side, my view explains how it is that internal duplicates are equally rational despite the fact that those in favorable epistemic environments have an advantage over their internally alike deceived counterparts. On the ethical side, it allows us to explain how it is that what we are rationally required to do affects what we ought to do. Indeed, I argue that what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Thus, on my picture, rationality is very important indeed.
***
A symposium was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2020, with contributions from Karl Schafer, Mark Schroeder, and Julia Staffel. My précis can be found here and my replies can be found here. Schafer's contribution can be found here, Schroeder's here, and Staffel's here.
A symposium was published in Analysis in 2021, with contributions from Matt Bedke & Bruno Guindon, Allan Hazlett, and Jonathan Way. My précis can be found here and my replies can be found here. Bedke & Guindon's contribution is here, Hazlett's is here, and Way's is here.
PeaSoup hosted an Ethics review forum on Nathan Robert Howard's review. You can find that here.
Review in NDPR by Hallvard Lillehammer
Review in Philosophical Review by Julia Staffel
Review in Ethics by Nathan Robert Howard
Review in the European Journal of Philosophy by Olle Risberg
Review in Philosophical Quarterly by Carlos Núñez
***
Here are some nice things people have said about the book:
"Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational is a tour de force treatment of the relationship between reasons, rationality, knowledge, and what Lord calls creditworthiness , the kind of achievement where you don’t just do what is right, but do it for the right reasons." Mark Schroeder in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
"Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational is a beautiful presentation of how one might defend a reasons‐first approach to rationality. And it has many insights that will be useful to non‐reasons‐firsters as well. As such, there’s a great deal in the details of Lord’s arguments that repays careful consideration." Karl Schafer in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
"[T]he book offers an informed, original, rich, sophisticated and exceptionally well-illustrated case for the claim that what we are rationally required to do and what we substantially ought to do is really the same thing. To follow Errol Lord on his route to this conclusion is a frequently rewarding experience and one that is well worth undertaking." Hallvard Lillehammer in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"The Importance of Being Rational marks a new moment in debates about the nature of rationality. It is absolutely compulsory reading for epistemologists, ethicists, and meta-ethicists alike." Nathan Robert Howard in Ethics
"The Importance of Being Rational is a rich, ambitious, and thought‐provoking book." Olle Risberg in the European Journal of Philosophy
"[Lord's] book is an essential reading in the literature on reasons." Julia Staffel in The Philosophical Review
"[T]he book is an admirable philosophical feat that rewards careful study. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature, and worth, of rationality." Carlos Núñez in The Philosophical Quarterly
Weighing Reasons
Oxford University Press, 2016, Co-Edited With Barry Maguire
In recent decades normative reasons--considerations that count in favor of one thing or another--have come to the theoretical fore in ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is weighted.
This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
Review in NDPR by Jussi Suikkanen
Review in Ethics by Justin Snedegar
Review in European Journal of Philosophy by Jonathan Way
Review in Analysis by Krister Bykvist
This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
Review in NDPR by Jussi Suikkanen
Review in Ethics by Justin Snedegar
Review in European Journal of Philosophy by Jonathan Way
Review in Analysis by Krister Bykvist