The Importance of Being rational
Oxford University Press, 2018
Despite the fact that rationality plays a central role in both ethics and epistemology, ethicists and epistemologists have come to significantly diverging views about rationality. In ethics and metaethics, it has become popular to think that rationality is a matter of being coherent in certain respects—e.g., not being akratic or means-end incoherent. Epistemologists disagree. Very few epistemologists think that being coherent is sufficient for being rational. This book defends a unified account of rationality that sides with the epistemologists. I argue that coherence is not sufficient for being rational. In so doing, I develop novel views that allow us to make progress on important problems in both metaethics and epistemology.
According to my view, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to the reasons you possess. Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of reacting in certain ways. The normative reasons you possess are the normative reasons that are within your ken in a privileged way. This book defends novel accounts of what it is to possess a reason, what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and what it is to be obligated to do something. I argue that these views allow us to explain the data about rationality and allow us to solve major problems in both ethics and epistemology.
On the epistemological side, my view explains how it is that internal duplicates are equally rational despite the fact that those in favorable epistemic environments have an advantage over their internally alike deceived counterparts. On the ethical side, it allows us to explain how it is that what we are rationally required to do affects what we ought to do. Indeed, I argue that what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Thus, on my picture, rationality is very important indeed.
For the table of contents and introduction, click here.
Several papers on the work page are stand alone versions of chapters (although in all cases the book has been substantially revised in light of subsequent developments). 'The Coherent and the Rational' is a version of chapter 2, 'Defeating the Externalist's Demons' is a version of chapter 6, and 'What You're Required To Do and What You Ought To Do (Are the Same Thing!)' is a version of chapter 7.
According to my view, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to the reasons you possess. Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of reacting in certain ways. The normative reasons you possess are the normative reasons that are within your ken in a privileged way. This book defends novel accounts of what it is to possess a reason, what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and what it is to be obligated to do something. I argue that these views allow us to explain the data about rationality and allow us to solve major problems in both ethics and epistemology.
On the epistemological side, my view explains how it is that internal duplicates are equally rational despite the fact that those in favorable epistemic environments have an advantage over their internally alike deceived counterparts. On the ethical side, it allows us to explain how it is that what we are rationally required to do affects what we ought to do. Indeed, I argue that what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Thus, on my picture, rationality is very important indeed.
For the table of contents and introduction, click here.
Several papers on the work page are stand alone versions of chapters (although in all cases the book has been substantially revised in light of subsequent developments). 'The Coherent and the Rational' is a version of chapter 2, 'Defeating the Externalist's Demons' is a version of chapter 6, and 'What You're Required To Do and What You Ought To Do (Are the Same Thing!)' is a version of chapter 7.
Weighing Reasons
Oxford University Press, 2016, Co-Edited With Barry Maguire
In recent decades normative reasons--considerations that count in favor of one thing or another--have come to the theoretical fore in ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is weighted.
This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
Review in NDPR by Jussi Suikkanen
Review in Ethics by Justin Snedegar
Review in European Journal of Philosophy by Jonathan Way
Review in Analysis by Krister Bykvist
This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
Review in NDPR by Jussi Suikkanen
Review in Ethics by Justin Snedegar
Review in European Journal of Philosophy by Jonathan Way
Review in Analysis by Krister Bykvist